Eidos, No 33 (2020)

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Love and Reasons [Spanish]

Juan Pablo Hernández


Love and rationality are often considered as capacities which easily come into conflict, or are even opposed to one another. In the paper I elaborate on some points suggested by Harry Frankfurt in order to propose that the relation between love and rationality is not one of opposition. After offering a characterization of love as a hybrid multi-track disposition, I will argue that love is rational in the following sense: although love is not justifiable, it is nevertheless a source of basic and sometimes irresistible reasons which to a large extent shape the field of our rationality. This does not mean that love is an irrational or arrational foundation, or that it is impervious to reason; it only means that in certain circumstances it makes sense to subject love to rational scrutiny.


Dispositions; emotions; love; irrationality; arrationality.


Artículo de investigación científica y tecnológica


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Electronic ISSN: 2011-7477
Department of Humanities and Philosophy
Universidad del Norte
Contact: eidos@uninorte.edu.co