A Leibnizian Revision to Mechanicism [Spanish]
The purpose of this article is to develop a second lecture to modern mechanism. This implies that an adequate understanding of it consists, above all, to consider it as a project and not as a consolidated doctrinal system. In order to achieve this, we grab Leibniz’s philosophy as our fundamental theme, which, differentiating itself of Cartesianism, identifies the inconsistencies that are implied when we conceive mechanism as a complete philosophical system, mainly when pretending to justify mechanically the natural world; this is, from figure, size and movement. All of the above does not imply that Leibniz rejects entirely mechanism, but it allows us to understand it as a mean to develop his philosophy, proposing a complementarity between final cause and efficient cause. In this way, mechanism is relocated as a methodological problem for natural science and not as a metaphysical problem.
Keywordsmechanism, efficient cause, final cause, Garber, Leibniz.
TypeArtículo de reflexión
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