Eidos, No 26

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Are Dennett’s Evolutionary Debunking By-Producing Arguments against the Rationality of Theism Valid? [Spanish]

Jorge Sierra Merchán


Recently, the cognitive science of religion has allowed the development of evo­lutionary debunking arguments, which seek to challenge not only rationality but the truth of theism. Since there are two ways of conceiving epistemic rationality and justification, viz., the internalist and the externalist, one may wonder ¿how such ar­guments affect theism? The purpose of this article is to answer this question through a reconstruction and evaluation of three evolutionary debunking arguments against the rationality of theism that Dennett would hold. I will argue that only one of the three Dennett’s evolutionary debunking arguments is possibly valid. I will also show that the argument of cognitive bias is probably successful in undermining both the internalist and externalist justification of theism, under certain conditions. Finally, I will show that this arguments can be indirectly disproved from evolutionary argument against naturalism developped by Plantinga, argument to which one can counterpose logical defeater argument against the reformed epistemology.


evolutionary debunking arguments, theism, atheism, Dennett, rationality, Plantinga.


Artículo de investigación científica y tecnológica

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Electronic ISSN: 2011-7477
Department of Humanities and Philosophy
Universidad del Norte
Contact: eidos@uninorte.edu.co