The Kierkegaardian Concept of Conscience as an Implication of the External World: A Critique to the Cartesian Approach [Spanish]

Authors

  • Yerlis Guardo González Docente medio tiempo del Departamento de Humanidades de la Universidad del Sinú- Seccional Cartagena

Keywords:

epistemology, existentialism

Abstract

This article aims at showing how the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, through his concept of conscience, criticizes Cartesian skepticism upon affirming the impossibility of doubting the outside world, since the very possibility of doubt presupposes the existence of a conscience that produces and is produced by the trichotomic relationship between ideality and reality, or, in other words, mediate­ness and immediacy. For this, the Cartesian approach will be explained in the first place, namely: the three levels of doubt and the cogito ergo sum. Then the notion of conscience and ideal possibility of the doubt of the Danish author will be explained, and finally, it will be explained how, in the perspective of this notion of conscience, Kierkegaard makes a strong critique to the methodical doubt and to the cartesian cogito like demonstration of existence.


Author Biography

  • Yerlis Guardo González, Docente medio tiempo del Departamento de Humanidades de la Universidad del Sinú- Seccional Cartagena

    Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar (Cartagena, Colombia)

    lara1922@gmail.com

    Filósofa por la Universidad de Car­tagena (2014). Especialista en forma­ción en Lúdica educativa por la Fun­dación Universitaria Juan De Caste­llanos. Trabaja como docente de Éti­ca y Profesionalismo en Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar y docente de filosofía en Institución Educativa Olga González de Arraut. Su inte­rés investigativo actual alterna entre la ética, la bioética, la educación y el pensamiento de Kierkegaard. Entre sus publicaciones destaca: “Una re­afirmación de la cultura patriarcal a partir de la definición de mujer de Kierkegaard en “El Diario” (2013). “¿Quién Es (R)? Una consideración en torno a la identidad a partir del Primer Trasplante de Cabeza en hu­manos” (2018).


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Published

2018-12-03

Issue

No. 30 (2019): January-june

Section

Articles

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