



Between the War of the Pacific and the Monroe Doctrine. Peruvian Foreign Policy Against U.S. Intervention After the Fall of Lima (1881-1884)¹

*Entre la guerra del Pacífico y la Doctrina Monroe. La política exterior peruana
frente a la intervención de Estados Unidos tras la caída de Lima (1881-1884)*

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Abstract

The United States closely monitored the evolution of the trajectory of the war in the Pacific. As a regional power, and within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine, it prevented Europe from diplomatically intervene to mediate between the belligerent countries. American diplomacy offered its good offices from the beginning of the conflict, but this effort intensified following the inauguration of Republican President James Garfield, and after the fall of Lima (January, 1881). This study, based on previously unpublished archival sources, traces the actions of U.S. diplomacy from the perspective of Peruvian foreign policy and its legation in Washington. It examines how the U.S. Department of State interpreted and readjusted the Monroe Doctrine as Peru's defeat was sealed by the Treaty of Ancón (1883), shifting from a position of support for Peru to an unequivocal alignment with Chile.

Keywords: war of the Pacific (1879-1884), Peruvian foreign policy, United States mediation, North American diplomacy, Peruvian diploma.

Resumen

Estados Unidos estuvo pendiente de la evolución de la trayectoria que tomaba la guerra del Pacífico. Como potencia regional y en el marco de la Doctrina Monroe no permitió la intervención diplomática de Europa para que llevase a cabo una mediación ante los países beligerantes. La diplomacia norteamericana ofreció sus buenos oficios desde el inicio del conflicto, pero se hizo con mayor énfasis con la asunción del presidente republicano James Garfield y tras la caída de Lima (enero de 1881). La presente investigación basada en información de archivos inéditos realiza un seguimiento a las acciones de la diplomacia norteamericana desde la perspectiva de la política exterior peruana y su legación en Washington, pues la Doctrina Monroe fue interpretada y reajustada por la Secretaría de Estado norteamericano en la medida en que se imponía la derrota peruana con el tratado de Ancón (1883); transitando desde un apoyo al Perú hacia uno inequívoco con Chile.

Palabras clave: guerra del Pacífico (1879-1884), política exterior del Perú, mediación de Estados Unidos, diplomacia norteamericana, diplomacia peruana.

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Introduction

Background to U.S. Intervention Before and During the War of the Pacific (1879-1880)

Diplomatic history is a continuously evolving social discipline that allows us to understand how the foreign policy decision-making process develops amidst the intervention of diplomatic service officials and the influence of domestic politics (Harvey, 2022). As Javier Castro (2022) and Constanza Gajardo (2022) point out, the new diplomatic history is a laboratory of ideas that focuses, not only on the study of international relations as a whole, but also on individuals and other actors (Parliament, political parties, and public opinion) who perform diplomatic functions (Pereira, 1992, pp. 181-182). This makes it possible to shift both the perspective and the scale at which events are studied and, at the same time, to contextualize state power and structure, moving beyond the limited understanding of diplomacy as state-centric—that is, focused on the conduct of relations between nation-states and the negotiation of national entities (Arévalo, 2018, p. 13; Ostos, 2016, p. 92).

The diplomatic history of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) in Peru has recently been strengthened by the contributions of Gerardo Trillo (2022) and Julio Abanto (2022, 2023b). The former analyzes the bilateral relations between Peru and Argentina during that context, through the work of Peruvian diplomats Aníbal de la Torre and Evaristo Gómez Sánchez. The second reconstructs the trajectory of the Peruvian legations in La Paz, to strengthen that alliance, and in France, to obtain funds during the occupation of Lima (1881-1883). This impulse was motivated by the publication of unpublished sources such as the compilation and selection of works by Carmen Mc Evoy (2016) and José de la Puente Candamo, alongside José de la Puente Brunke (2016). In the first case, a diversity of new documents from Chilean archives covering different moments of the war are presented. In the second case, we present the valuable documentation produced by the Delegación del Supremo Gobierno, an entity empowered to operate on both the domestic and external fronts, serving as a link between Lima and Vice President Lizardo Montero, who was then in Cajamarca.

The relationship between the United States and Latin America after the American Civil War was one of political and diplomatic interdependence. Its emergence as a regional and global power included the purchase of Alaska in 1867 and increased its influence in the Isthmus of Panama. It also entered a period of interventionism aimed at expanding its economic development and opposed the Euro-

pean presence, taking the Monroe Doctrine as its basis (Barreto, 2019, p. 116). Presidents Ulysses S. Grant (1869–1877) and Rutherford B. Hayes (1877–1881) continued this foreign policy. Before long, however, Washington's discourse on the interoceanic canal shifted: first it was framed as a matter of common interest, and later as an issue over which the United States should exercise unilateral control. The new administration of James Garfield set out to play a greater role in Latin American political conflicts, intervening diplomatically in disputes between Mexico and Guatemala, Peru and Chile, Argentina and Chile, and in the question of forming a Central American Union. In this phase, James Blaine played a key role from the Department of State, despite his brief first term and resistance within the Republican Party, which reflected the influence of former president Grant in shaping both domestic and foreign policy (Toussaint, 1999, p. 75).

Regarding Peruvian-American relations, Peru considered it essential to have diplomatic representation in Washington since 1846², because of the relevance that the United States would have in the region. In the following thirty years, bilateral relations were marked by a dispute over free trade in the exploitation of guano, with the capture of the American ships *Lizzie* and *Thompson* in the 1850s. Between 1860 and 1870, after the Civil War, diplomatic cooperation was strengthened in two key areas: mediation for a truce between the Quadruple Alliance (Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador) and Spain, in 1871; and support for Peru to establish contact with China and Japan in 1873. Despite these results, the economic crisis forced the Peruvian legation to close in 1875, being reopened the following year (Abanto, 2014; Garibaldi, 2003; Clayton, 1998; Bruce 1999; Paz Soldán, 1891, pp. 302-311; Situ, 2020). The War of the Pacific is an important episode in these relations. In this matter, we have the works of Margarita Guerra (1991) on the nature of Francisco García Calderón's regime in 1881; Daniel Parodi (2001), with the study of the diplomatic history of the war after the fall of Lima; Julio Abanto analyzed of García Calderón's peace proposal (2012, 2014). Finally, Alejandro Garland (1900) and José Ballón (2003) highlight that the American attitude in the peace negotiations was conditioned by the interests of Secretary of State James Blaine.

With the outbreak of war, Peru pursued several goals as part of its foreign policy: securing armaments, funds, and alliances, as well as responding to the

2 Between 1846 and 1886, the following Peruvian diplomats acted: José Joaquín de Osma (1846-1852), Juan Ignacio de Osma (1853-1857), Cipriano Coronel Zagarra (1859-1860), Federico Barreda (1861-1867), José Antonio García y García (1867), Manuel Freyre (1867-1878), José Carlos Tracy (1879-1880), Ignacio García (1880-1881), Juan Federico Elmore (1881-1883; 1884-1886), Eduardo Villena (1883-1884).

good offices offered by the international community (Abanto, 2023b). In relation to the United States, Peru developed two phases of strategic action: a military phase (1879-1880) and a diplomatic phase (1881-1883). The first focused on preparing the national defense and acquiring weapons (Remington rifles, munitions, torpedoes); New York became one of the main centers for purchasing and stockpiling supplies, with the assistance of the commercial firm William R. Grace, which took advantage of its branches in the United States, Panama, and South America (Sobrevilla, 2003; Soberón, 1977; Quiroz, 1983; Yábar, 2001; Carbajal, 2006; Clayton, 1998; ACMREP, 1879, CC 109). This stage also saw the first U.S. mediation efforts: in 1879, a proposal by Solomon Newton Pettis, diplomatic agent in Bolivia, had little effect³, and in 1880 a further attempt was made in Arica by the U.S. diplomats accredited to the belligerent countries—Isaac Christiancy⁴ (Peru), Thomas Andrew Osborn (Chile), and Charles Adams (Bolivia). However, Peru and Bolivia refused to accept territorial mutilation as a basis for peace, which was Chile's central condition. Negotiations broke down, and the proposal to resort to arbitration to resolve the conflict never came under substantive discussion (Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, hereafter BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1880, sobre 5000000763; ACMREP, 1880, CC 109, CC 122, CC 143; Garland, 1900, pp. 8-10).

The second stage was centered on the diplomatic work that Peru sought from the United States, appealing to the background of mediation with which it aligned its interests with the role played by the Monroe Doctrine in keeping the European powers away from any interference in America, or justifying the intervention of the United States with increasingly aggressive attitudes in Latin America in the 19th century, such as the control of the interoceanic canal in Panama. After a long period of isolation, interrupted by the war and the direct confrontation with Spain in 1898, the United States moved towards an imperialist foreign policy, with all the political connotations of that term (Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú. Hereafter, ACMREP, 1880, CC 109; Ghotme, 2017: 51-52; Sánchez: 2016b: 14; Arauz, 1994: 27-37). By 1881, the United States had elected a new president: James Garfield, for the 1881-1886 period, who belonged to the Republican Party, like his predecessors, Hayes and Grant.

3 Pettis was appointed in September 1878 and presented his credentials in La Paz in June, 1879. He left his post in October of that year.

4 Christiancy was minister plenipotentiary in Peru between 1879 and 1881, and Osborn was minister plenipotentiary in Chile until 1881, and then in Brazil (1881-1885); while Adams was so in Bolivia, between 1880 and 1882 (United States Department of State, 2023).

This research analyzes the trajectory of Peruvian foreign policy toward the United States, through the actions and activities undertaken by the Peruvian legation in Washington, headed by the experienced diplomat Juan Federico Elmore, who leveraged the influence of the figure of a regional power, the role of the new government of James Garfield, and the Monroe Doctrine to use in his favor a mediation that would hinder the loss of Tarapacá and its lands to Chile. Peruvian foreign policy would take advantage of a financial operation that prevented the territorial mutilation conceived by García Calderón after the fall of Lima in 1881, in the midst of a serious political crisis. However, following President Garfield's assassination that same year, United States foreign policy shifted under the new president, Chester A. Arthur, in its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: first in favor of Peru, and later in open support of Chile, clearly seeking closer ties with the victor of the war and accepting the postwar scenario imposed by Chile's military successes.

This change would destabilize the formulation of the Peruvian foreign policy, which expected U.S. aid until it became clear that it should expect nothing. This shift would have undermined the position of the Peruvian legation in Washington, moving it from a high-priority mission toward a more secondary role for Vice President Montero, who instead sought European mediation. Methodologically, and following the guidelines of diplomatic history, we analyze the role the Peruvian state sought to secure through U.S. intervention, examining documentation from the Peruvian legation held in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1881) and the Piérola Archive of the National Library of Peru (1882). We also draw on documents from the Historical Archive of the Instituto Riva-Agüero of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (1883), as well as materials published by Rogger Ravines (1992), José de la Puente Candamo and José de la Puente Brunke (2008), and President García Calderón (1884).

The Diplomatic Phase: The Oscillation of U.S. Diplomacy in the War (1881-1883)

The Foreign Policy of the Government of García Calderón to Obtain a Mediation that Favored Peru (1881)

When Lima fell into the hands of the Chilean army in January 1881, a power struggle between Nicolás de Piérola and Francisco García Calderón triggered a political crisis. The former had taken office through a coup d'état, while the latter was nominated by a junta of notables made up of Civilistas, Pradistas, and opponents

of Pierolismo. Each caudillo proclaimed himself president and promoted his own Congress and diplomatic service in order to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime. In foreign policy, the strategy for pursuing priority objectives differed under each leader. Piérola made the alliance with Bolivia and the search for funds in France his main priorities. The former would prevent Peru from remaining isolated in the midst of military defeats, so the Peruvian legation was tasked with concluding a commercial treaty and organizing a state visit to La Paz in June, thereby consolidating relations with the Bolivian president Narciso Campero. With regard to access to funds, the legation in France negotiated a new nitrate contract with the Société de Crédit Industriel de Paris, achieving this in February.

García Calderón, for his part, struggled against the perception that his was a government dependent on Chilean interests and concentrated all his efforts on a political-financial operation that would provide a diplomatic alternative without jeopardizing the source of the Lima elite's socio-economic hegemony: the Tarapacá nitrate fields (Abanto, 2012; Abanto, 2022). In this plan it was essential to secure the backing of U.S. foreign policy, since the aim was to obtain its diplomatic support to push through the Industrial Credit economic scheme, thereby enabling the payment of an indemnity to Chile to bring the war to an end. In exchange, Peru would grant Washington a naval station at Chimbote (the Gálvez-Hurlbut protocol), in order to counter British influence in the region. It should be noted that the international scope of this plan rested on García Calderón's extensive networks and connections as an officer of the country's main private enterprises: president of the Compañía Salitrera del Perú and vice-president of the Compañía de Fomento y Obras Públicas. The Peruvian diplomat who would make this operation viable was the Civilista Juan Federico Elmore⁵, who in 1879 was in China and moved to the United States in April 1881 as a confidential agent. Meanwhile in Lima, Foreign Minister Manuel María Gálvez worked to counter the close relationship between the U.S. legation and Piérola (Ballón, 2006; Ravines, 1992, p. 100; Abanto, 2012, 2017; ACMREP, 1881, caja 279, carpeta 6, Estados Unidos; BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1881, sobre 5000000610).

A step in support of this financial operation was the dispatch to the Peruvian capital of Francisco de Paula Suárez, an emissary of the Crédit Industriel (Crédito

5 Elmore was a professor of Roman law at Universidad de San Marcos (1871-1872), secretary of the legation in Japan and China (1874-1879). In March of 1879, Elmore was reviewing, in Beijing, the resumption of Chinese emigration, and the Chancellery was negotiating in England for the support of the British *Foreign Office* to obtain permission to use the port of Hong Kong. However, no agreement could be reached (ACMREP, 1879, 1880, CC 74, CC 133, CC 136, CC 143, CC 647).

Industrial), to finalize the agreement. Suárez was an old acquaintance of García Calderón: he had been secretary to Henry Meiggs, a U.S. entrepreneur, the principal railway builder in Peru, and president of the *Compañía de Fomento y Obras Públicas*. Upon his arrival, he assured Foreign Minister Gálvez that France, the United States, and Britain would recognize the contract signed in February by the Peruvian legation in France, but that it would no longer be implemented with Piérola's government, and instead with García Calderón (Abanto, 2023b). The plan was accepted, and Suárez returned to Washington to act as Elmore's liaison and, in April, to request an audience with the newly appointed Secretary of State James Blaine in order to obtain international recognition of the provisional government. From the outset, Blaine committed himself to this cause and, at the same time, sought a more prominent external role by invoking the Monroe Doctrine in the resolution of American conflicts. In May he granted recognition to Elmore, who, on receiving this news, requested additional funds from the Foreign Ministry to undertake a program of public diplomacy, but his request was denied (ACMREP, 1881, caja 279, carpeta 6, Estados Unidos; BNP, 1880, 1881, Archivo Piérola, sobres 5000000764, 5000000856, 5000000862).

The new U.S. attitude towards Peru was expressed with the change of its diplomats in Lima and Santiago: Judson Kilpatrick went to Chile and Stephen Hurlbut⁶ to Peru. As part of the Monroe Doctrine, the decision to have a more effective presence in the resolution of conflicts in South America was expressed not only in its mediation in the Pacific War, but also in another initiative taken by the American legations in Chile and Argentina to agree on a boundary treaty for Patagonia, which was achieved in July. That month, Hurlbut left for Peru, and before embarking he received a farewell dinner from Elmore. Then, the Peruvian diplomat traveled to Paris to meet with Francisco Rosas, Juan Mariano Goyeneche, and Mr. Randall, an agent of *Société Générale*, to clearly outline all aspects of the financial plan (Trillo, 2022; Lacoste, 2001; ACMREP, 1881, box 279, folder 6, United States; 1882, box 281, file 14, United States).

Hurlbut began a series of initiatives grounded in a refusal to countenance any territorial cession. In this way, he managed to shift the diplomatic balance of power between García Calderón and Piérola, who put forward no new proposals for a settlement because his priority was the approval of a National Statute to

6 Hurlbut was a military officer and had diplomatic experience as minister resident in Colombia (1869-1872). He presented his credentials in Lima on August 2, 1881, and died on March 27, 1882 (United States Department of State, 2023).

replace the 1860 Constitution. The Chilean government, for its part, viewed this situation with concern, since it risked losing, through diplomacy, the territories it had won on the battlefield. Hurlbut had already informed Patricio Lynch, head of the Chilean occupation, that he would not accept the loss of Tarapacá as a condition for negotiating peace, and he recognized García Calderón as the legitimate government. These instructions issued by Secretary Blaine in favor of Peru took everyone by surprise, as they contrasted with the stance of his counterpart Judson Kilpatrick in Chile. To offset Hurlbut's influence within the diplomatic corps and on the political scene, Lynch sought to counterbalance the situation by cultivating relations with the European diplomats (from France and Britain) resident in Lima, encouraging their existing tensions with Hurlbut (Ravines 1992, pp. 76, 79-100; Martinic 1987, pp. 61-62).

In light of this situation, the Chilean government decided in September to put an end to García Calderón's regime, disarming his personal guard and seizing the funds in his treasury. Despite the protests, everything seemed settled for the provisional government; however, the offers made by the United States bore fruit, since the Arequipa army rose up against Piérola, refused to recognize him, and declared its support for García Calderón. He soon received backing from other military commanders in the north (Lizardo Montero) and in the center (Andrés A. Cáceres). To avoid a civil war, Piérola sent Francisco Ramos and Juan Martín Echeñique to Cusco as commissioners to negotiate a ceasefire, stressing that U.S. mediation would not be effective because the belligerents would first have to request it and it could not be imposed. Finally, once it became clear that the situation was irreversible, Piérola resigned on 28 November, and Chile had García Calderón arrested and exiled to prevent him from consolidating power. He was replaced by Vice President Montero, who was in Cajamarca (BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1881, sobres 5000000612, 5000000647, 5000000927; 1882, sobre 5000000878; Ravines 1992, pp. 81-102; Colección Manuscritos, Documento D3992, 1881).

As we have seen, García Calderón's plan rested on very fragile foundations. The alignment between the United States and the Crédito Industrial came to an abrupt end after the death of U.S. president James Garfield in September. This event had profound repercussions, effectively bringing the initiative to a halt once U.S. foreign policy shifted with the accession of Vice President Chester Arthur and the new secretary of state, Frederick Frelinghuysen. The plan was shelved, and the Crédito Industrial likewise withdrew from any further negotiations. Before this collapse, Blaine had taken three steps: in November he called a Pan-American

Congress to propose arbitration as a way out of the war, a meeting that some countries, such as Spain, viewed with suspicion; he also dismissed Hurlbut in Lima and sent a mediation mission headed by William Trescot and his son W. Blaine. Later, the Department of State's instructions to its legations in South America between 1879 and 1881 were made public. By then, however, nothing would be as it had been before, and Peruvian foreign policy remained trapped in the expectation of a favorable U.S. diplomatic move that would not be repeated over the course of the war (Martinic, 1987: 61-62; Sánchez, 2016a: 151, 159-161; Sánchez, 2016b: 22-23).

The Foreign Policy of the Montero Government Against U.S. Detachment (1882)

The Trescot Mission, the Investigation Against James Blaine, and the Crisis of the Peace Strategy without Territorial Cession (First Half of 1882)

Trescot and Blaine arrived in Santiago on 13 January, 1882. Chile accepted the measure, and it materialized with the Viña del Mar protocol. The instructions of the North American diplomats changed, as now they allowed territorial mutilation as a basis for peace, leaving behind the request for war indemnity, leaving Peru weakened. In Washington, Elmore met with Vice President Arthur, who assured him that he was unaware of the protocol and that his foreign policy remained unchanged. To ascertain the position of Montero's government, Trescot had to travel to Lima, and when he arrived in March he learned of Hurlbut's death. The Peruvian authorities observed a period of mourning and formally acknowledged the "repeated demonstrations he had given of his love for Peru and his firm resolve to uphold its territorial integrity at all costs" (BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1882, sobre 5000000878; ACMREP, 1882, caja 282, file 17, Agentes confidenciales; ACMREP, 1882, CC 150).

Meanwhile, Elmore witnessed the collapse of the plan. Even so, he closely followed the statements of President Chester Arthur and Florida senator Call aimed at preventing the dismemberment of Peru. He also became involved in the investigation against Jacob Shipherd and his company *Compañía Peruana*, as well as other businessmen such as Cochet and Landreau, who claimed ownership of Peruvian guano deposits. In the U.S. Congress, Democratic senators Blair and Belmont accused Blaine of yet another alleged deal with García Calderón in connection with these claims; however, the investigations ultimately failed to prove his culpability, thereby clearing "the memory of General Garfield and General Hurlbut," even as they damaged Peru's image (ACMREP, 1882, CC 149; 1882, cajas 281 y 282, files 14 y 17, Estados Unidos, Agentes confidenciales).

These lines of questioning formed part of the broader conflicts between the Republican and Democratic parties. For that reason, Foreign Minister Mariano Álvarez asked Elmore for more detailed information about these parliamentary sessions, which were reported daily in newspapers such as the *New York Herald* and the *World* (a paper close to the family of the diplomat Hurlbut). It was unlikely that Blaine would be indicted, since the Republican Party held a majority in the House of Representatives (151 versus 128) and in the Senate (37). As part of the investigation, Elmore appeared before Congress in May and, before doing so, sought advice from Robert Randall, the *Crédito Industrial*'s lawyer. Testimony was also given by George Bliss, a member of the New York bank Morton, Bliss & Co. His employer, Levi Morton, was another of those under investigation and, at the time of García Calderón's deal, had been head of the U.S. legation in France, involving himself in the *Crédito Industrial* negotiations. Blaine was ultimately cleared of the charges and later became the Republican Party's presidential candidate in 1884, but he lost the election to Grover Cleveland⁷ (United States Senate and House of Representatives, 2023; ACMREP, 1882, caja 281, file 14; caja 282, file 17, Agentes confidenciales; CC 150).

Despite these setbacks, Foreign Minister Álvarez continued to place great faith in U.S. intervention, leaving the entire conduct of foreign policy dependent on the resumption of a mediation favorable to Peru. His confidence rested on the idea that Peru was a key country for the United States in the region at a time of tensions with Britain, and he tacitly appealed to the application of the Monroe Doctrine. For that reason, he was troubled by the lack of reports from Elmore, who had already exhausted his funds and asked the Ministry of Finance to transfer him the necessary support. Meanwhile, in April Trescot held a series of meetings with Lynch and the members of the Delegación de Lima (Manuel Candamo and Carlos Elías). He then decided to seek out Montero in Huaraz and asked Lynch for authorization to be accompanied by leading *civilistas*. This request was granted. The meeting with Montero was held on the following bases: the cession of Tarapacá, Chilean retention of Arica and Tacna, and a possible three-year truce. However, he could not begin negotiations with Chile because Montero's government had not been recognized. Trescot attempted to mediate in order to secure that recognition, but he was unsuccessful and returned to Washington (BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1882, sobre 5000000831; ACMREP, 1882, caja 282, file 17, Agentes confidenciales; CC 150;

7 Later, he would return to the Department of State under Republican President Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893), and, during his administration, he was able to hold the long-awaited Pan American Congress, announced ten years earlier (Manger, n.d.).

Ravines, 1992, p. 114; Archivo Histórico del Instituto Riva Agüero de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, hereafter AHRA-IRA-PUCP, Colección Denegri, FDL 1116, 1882).

Foreign Minister Álvarez rejected the cession of Tarapacá and asked Elmore for new reports in order to rethink foreign policy strategy, since he was “there precisely to inform him of what was happening, which only through Your Lordship could he know, and had to know in a timely manner.” Álvarez needed further clarification to determine whether to maintain the position of peace without territorial cession, but urgently needed to know the opinion of the U.S. government and whether it would once again back Peru as an ally. By that point, Secretary of State Frelinghuysen had no interest in committing himself in South American affairs. When no reply was forthcoming from Elmore, he was dismissed, and Álvarez appointed himself as the new head of the legation on 24 July. He was unable to depart for Washington, however, because he was taken prisoner and sent to Chile along with other Peruvian political figures. Montero, for his part, transferred his government from Huaraz to Arequipa, making the latter the new Peruvian capital (BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1882, sobre 5000000831; ACMREP, 1882, CC 149, CC 150).

American Diplomacy in Favor of Chile: The Logan Mission in Santiago (Second Half of 1882)

In August, several members of *civilismo* and *pirolismo*—the Peruvian political elite—were arrested and sent to Chile as reprisal for Chile’s victories in the central highlands, which deepened the state of anarchy and crisis. The new U.S. diplomat Cornelius Logan arrived in Santiago on 7 September to begin negotiations with President García Calderón, then in captivity but still regarded as the acting head of state. Both men traveled to Angol on the 14th to meet with the other prisoners, without accepting the loss of Tarapacá as a condition for peace. Logan pressed for a rapid agreement and urged acceptance of the cession of that province along with the sale of Tacna and Arica, arguing that the Chilean Foreign Ministry would otherwise impose even harsher terms. This stance, favorable to Chile, was denounced by García Calderón before James Partridge, Hurlbut’s replacement in Lima⁸, on the grounds that Logan “had not known how, or had not wished, to make mediation effective.” In a second meeting, the prisoners resigned themselves to ceding Tarapacá, but refused to sell the other two provinces, insisting instead that their status be resolved through arbitration (AHRA-IRA-PUCP, Colección Denegri,

8 Previously, Partridge was minister resident in Honduras (1862), El Salvador (1863-1866), Venezuela (1869-1870), and Brazil (1871-1877) (United States Department of State, 2023).

FDL 1116, 1879; BNP, Colección Porras Barrenechea, 1882; García Calderón, 1884, pp. 13-36, 130-133).

Meanwhile, in Washington, Elmore followed events in Chile closely in October, but the news he received was inaccurate. The Associated Press and other U.S. newspapers reported that Logan and García Calderón had reached an agreement and were traveling to Arequipa to sign the peace treaty. Elmore relayed this information to Guayaquil, Paris, and La Paz. Together with the Bolivian diplomat Ladislao Cabrera, representing an allied country, he went to the State Department to obtain further details from Logan's dispatches, but neither Secretary Frelinghuysen nor Undersecretary Davis confirmed the reports. Only days later, on the ninth, cable news arrived confirming that negotiations in Chile had broken down and that García Calderón had never been released. Weeks later, García Calderón named the prisoner José María Químper as envoy to reopen talks directly with President Santa María, without intermediaries and without Logan, but these efforts likewise failed to produce an agreement (ACMREP, 1882, caja 281, file 14, Estados Unidos; caja 282, file 1, Bolivia; BNP, Archivo Piérولا, 1882, sobre 5000000798; caja 282, file 17, Agentes confidenciales).

Excluded from these efforts, Logan tried to regain the initiative by writing a letter to Montero, reiterating that Chile demanded the cession of Tarapacá and the purchase of Tacna and Arica. He did not foresee that this information would be leaked and published in full by the *Estrella de Panamá*, which placed the U.S. diplomat in a very awkward position. Montero regarded this as a serious incident, since García Calderón had been bypassed, and described Logan as "Chile's lawyer." With this move, the Peruvian Foreign Ministry belatedly abandoned U.S. mediation as an option and instructed Elmore to protest Logan's conduct before Frelinghuysen. The latter, however, merely confirmed that Chilean demands could escalate in the future. Two new problems were also emerging in Peru: Miguel Iglesias's rebellion in the north, in alignment with Chilean aims, and a delicate moment in the alliance with Bolivia after Peru rejected their joint request for a ceasefire in July (BNP, Archivo Piérولا, 1882, sobre 5000000921; De la Puente Candamo y De la Puente Brunke, 2008, pp. 220, 224, 302; AHRA-IRA-PUCP, Colección Denegri, FDL 2049, 1884; FDL 1116, 1882, 1883; ACMREP, 1883, caja 283, file 31, Estados Unidos; Garland, 1900; García Calderón, 1884, pp. 130-133).

A third problem soon arose. In November Elmore warned of the destabilizing presence of Piérولا in the United States. After settling in France, Piérولا had traveled to Washington in an attempt to obtain a new mediation. On his arrival in

New York, his upkeep was covered by the Casa Comercial Grace, and he was guided by Guillermo Bogardus, Carlos Flint, and William Grace, the city's mayor, all of them sympathetic to *piérolismo*. Through the good offices of the Chilean diplomat Joaquín Godoy—who hoped to use the caudillo to supplant García Calderón—Piérola obtained a non-official audience with Secretary Frelinghuysen on the 20th. The meeting had little impact, and Piérola returned to Europe without accepting Chile's proposed peace terms. Elmore's handling of the situation, however, was judged disastrous by Francisco Rosas⁹, Peruvian diplomatic agent in France, and García Calderón himself complained that his letters went unanswered at such a critical juncture. In his own defense, Elmore argued that this shift was due to Peru's political disunity and to Chile's use of funds to influence the press. Moreover, President Arthur made it clear that the United States would in no way involve itself in the war (Abanto, 2021; BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1882, sobres 5000000798, 5000000856, 5000000921).

With American mediation ruled out, the legation in Washington lost its strategic value for Peruvian foreign policy, which now languished for lack of funds. Elmore's health deteriorated to the point that he was no longer able even to send regular correspondence to Vice President Montero. He could only forward a few printed documents, such as the State Department volumes *War in South America and Attempt to Bring About a Peace 1880-81* and *Foreign Relations of the United States 1881*. He repeatedly appealed to the Foreign Ministry for aid so that he would not have to "go around begging to be sent what is necessary to maintain the legation, or spend whole days looking for friends or others who might lend him something to pay the month's bills." These pleas eventually had some effect: Rosas authorized a one-time draft for 1,000 pesos, although this was only a temporary solution (ACMREP, 1882, cajas 282 y 283, files 17 y 31, Estados Unidos, Agentes confidenciales; 1883, caja 285, file 9, Agentes confidenciales; caja 283, file 31, Estados Unidos; BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1882, sobre 5000000798; García Calderón, 1884, pp. 130-133; AHRA-IRA-PUCP, Colección Denegri, FDL 2049, 1883).

9 Francisco Rosas Balcázar (1829-1899). Physician and politician. Founder and one of the leaders of the Civil Party. He was Minister of Government (1871-1874), mayor of Lima (1875), senator of the Republic (1876-1879, 1886-1889), economic commissioner alongside Juan Mariano de Goyeneche for the settlement of the foreign debt (1879), and a diplomatic agent of Peru in England and France (1881-1883). In: De la Puente Candamo and De la Puente Brunke, 2016, p. 100.

The Foreign Policy of the Montero and Iglesias Governments: The Failure of the U.S. Intervention and the End of the War (1883-1884)

Montero's Diplomatic Efforts to Get the United States to Allow European Intervention (1883)

As part of the United States' withdrawal from the war, its legation in Lima, headed by Partridge, held a meeting in January 1883 with members of the diplomatic corps of England, France, and Italy to explore the possibility of European mediation. He had considered this option for some time: he did not understand why Peruvian politicians took American support as a given. However, his conduct was completely disapproved by his government and contravened the Monroe Doctrine which did not allow for European interference in American affairs. Partridge was ordered to return to Washington immediately in March and was replaced by Seth Phelps¹⁰. This new incident was regretted by the Peruvian Chancellery, because the United States would not permit the interference of another country in the resolution of the war, and, officially, Secretary Frelinghuysen stated that his country wished to resume mediation under three conditions that were negotiated with diplomat Godoy: recognition of the provisional government, cession of Tarapacá, and acceptance of arbitration. Likewise, Partridge also left the country without ever having presented his credentials to Montero in Arequipa (ACMREP, 1882, CC 149; 1883, CC 156; 1883, box 283, file 31, United States; García Calderón, 1884, pp. 135-136; Abanto, 2017, p. 191).

Meanwhile, Elmore made an assessment of the problems that had to be taken into account in order to direct foreign policy: the political schism provoked by Miguel Iglesias and the non-recognition of the Montero government by Chile, England, Spain, and Germany. In addition to these issues, there was the unfavorable role, for Peru, of the American press, and the need for funds to influence public figures, subsidize newspapers, and pay for publications. This balance was not taken into account by the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was determined to obtain the mediation of the European powers and its execution was entrusted to the legation in France and England, in charge of Francisco Rosas, who had been in Europe since 1879, and achieved, in 1882, the recognition of the Montero Government. This allowed the accreditation of Rosas as a diplomatic agent. The basis of the negotiations shifted from a demand for monetary indemnity to one that accepted the cession of Tarapacá but excluded the sale of Tacna and Arica

¹⁰ Phelps presented his credentials on April 24, 1884, and died on June 24, 1885 (United States Department of State, 2023).

(García Calderón, 1884, pp. 139-144, 161; ACMREP, 1883, caja 283, file 31, Estados Unidos; BNP, Archivo Piérola, 1883, sobre 5000000798).

Thus, in 1883, Rosas began talks with the Minister of Foreign Trade, Charles Duclerc, without achieving any result. He continued with the new French Foreign Minister, Paul-Armand Challemel-Lacour, who explicitly stated that the United States obstructed the intervention of Europe, so it was not possible for France to participate. Moreover, French priorities were not centered on the problems in America, but on the administration of its colonies in East Asia and Africa. With this response, Rosas considered his efforts in Paris to have culminated and continued in London before the *Foreign Office*. There, his task was even more difficult, since Montero's government had not been recognized and therefore had no standing. Nevertheless, through private démarches he learned that there would be no diplomatic intervention unless the United States first made its position explicit, and that, as a prior condition, the Peruvian Congress had to pass legislation in favor of peace. Elmore would later confirm that the Monroe Doctrine acted as a powerful lightning rod in this matter (ACMREP, 1883, caja 284, file 8, Inglaterra; caja 284, files 6 y 8, Francia; caja 283, carpeta 31, Estados Unidos; CC 158; 1882-1883, CC 260).

At the same time, Iglesias, proclaimed by the Northern Assembly as regenerative president, and who established his seat of government in Cajamarca, directly negotiated with Chile, in the first quarter of 1883, a protocol in which he ceded Tarapacá and retained Tacna and Arica for 10 years. This was a measure that distinguished him from García Calderón y Montero, who had accepted the loss of Tarapacá's saltpeter early on, as well as his firm opposition to civilization. His foreign policy was based on his relationship with the Chilean government, which would support him politically, economically, and militarily. The defeat of Andrés A. Cáceres' resistance forces in the battle of Huamachuco in July allowed Iglesias to leave Cajamarca for Trujillo in September (Abanto, 2012). Finally, he arrived in Lima in October to sign the peace treaty in Ancon. That same month, the city of Arequipa would fall, and Montero's regime would disappear, and he would leave the country for Argentina. In the last year of his life, he had favoured maintaining the alliance with Bolivia in order to avoid international isolation. In the midst of this scenario, Elmore contemplated, completely deprived of resources, how the Government was falling apart. His work between May and October was very discreet, living in deplorable conditions (ACMREP, 1883, box 283, file 31, United States).

The Government of Iglesias and the Reestablishment of Relations with the United States: Eduardo Villena and Juan Federico Elmore (1883-1884)

Iglesias, installed as the new ruler, set about reorganizing the diplomatic system, removing the staff of all the legations in America and Europe. For this, he relied on the political support of pierolists, which, as enemies of the outgoing Montero government, left behind its abstentionist policy and many of its members adhered to Iglesias. This closeness was evident, and this meant that several pierolist diplomats were appointed to the legations: Antonio Reyna in Ecuador, Enrique Bustamante in Bolivia, Aurelio García y García in England, and Eduardo Villena in the United States. This change meant Elmore's retirement from Washington in November, and his main mission was to obtain the recognition of Iglesias, to determine how much funds the legation had between 1881 and 1883, and to organize the consulate system. Villena's first tasks included providing details of the Treaty of Ancon and clarifying an article in the New York Herald about the surrender of Arequipa. He also facilitated financial agent Guillermo Bogardus in his trip to London to resolve the debt that *Peruvian Guano* had with the Peruvian Government (ACMREP, 1883, box 283, file 31. United States; CC 193).

In December, Villena stated that President Arthur would recognize Iglesias after meeting with Secretary Frelinghuysen to know his opinion on the situation in Peru, and he was recognized in January of 1884. Everything was in place for him to continue in charge of the legation for the rest of the year; however, the Chancellery made a radical decision: Elmore was reinstated and he decided to collaborate with the new regime and adhered unreservedly. After verifying his suitability, and in order to take advantage of all his experience in the United States, the Chancellery confirmed this detachment and transferred Villena to Venezuela to foster relations with President Antonio Guzmán Blanco (ACMREP, 1883, box 283, file 31. United States).

Elmore returned to Washington in the first quarter of 1884. After the war, he committed himself to fulfill two objectives: to personally lead the arrival of the first Chinese legation in Peru, which came to investigate the situation of his compatriots in the haciendas; and to promote cooperative relations with the United States, announcing the forthcoming arrival of Seth Phelps as head of his legation in Lima. Meanwhile, in Peru, there was a civil war between Iglesias and General Cáceres, which ended with the victory of the latter, who removed Iglesias' diplomatic corps, and thus, Elmore was dismissed in 1886 (*El Peruano*, April 26, 1884; ACMRE, CC 167).

Conclusions

After the fall of Lima, an uncertain scenario opened up for Peru due to the appearance of two politically opposed parallel governments, both of trying to impose their hegemony and their model of State management and foreign policy. Both García Calderón and Piérola considered it essential not to lose Tarapacá because of what it represented economically for the country's fiscal coffers, a reason to analyze how to negotiate with Chile without economically. In this sense, the Government of García Calderón developed a plan as part of its foreign policy and aligned itself with the interests of the United States, and the particular interest of Secretary of State James Blaine, in order to ensure a better presence in the continent as part of the Monroe Doctrine, using the saltpeter business that Société Générale had with Peru.

This international plan was executed by the Peruvian legation under the leadership of the former civil diplomat Juan Federico Elmore, who took advantage of the predisposition of Secretary Blaine to promote the rapprochement with American diplomacy, and the new head of its legation in Lima, Stephen Hurlbut. Thus, in the second half of 1881, Chile was forced to consider carefully what steps to take in order not to lose everything it had achieved in the battle, and to avoid a political crisis for the new Government of Domingo Santa María. However, García Calderón's plan collapsed with the death of President James Garfield, because he was replaced by Vice-President Chester Arthur, which led to the abrupt departure and congressional investigation of Blaine, when a diplomatic favoritism for Peru was revealed, completely changing the steps taken by Hurlbut and the bases for peace that his successor, Trescot, had to present in Chile. The manner in which the mediation had been conducted was abandoned, and the Peruvian foreign policy based on this support was left disconcerted. This change would have been more pronounced with the inactivity of the American mediation in the first half of 1882, with Trescot in Lima and Huaraz finding that the talks had become hopelessly bogged down.

The new Secretary of State, Frelinghuysen, was aware that new measures had to be adopted in the face of the war and that the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted by the United States, was unfavorable to Peru because it prioritized an assessment of the military and political situation in the region. This rapprochement with Chile was a step towards balancing and containing British interests in Latin America, but it did not guarantee an optimal relationship in the medium term, as the incidents in Panama in 1885 and Baltimore in 1891 showed. Therefore, Logan's

actions imposing more onerous bases to García Calderón and vice-president Montero, who only accepted the loss of Tarapacá, but not of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, are understandable. The relations between Arequipa, Santiago, and Washington became increasingly difficult and influenced the decrease of value of the Peruvian legation, its isolation, leaving Elmore without resources, believing that he had failed in his mission and that the time had come to seek the intervention of the European powers as mediators, failing due to North American obstruction. This abandonment would have consequences months later, when Elmore would abandon Montero and support the new president Iglesias, seeking Washington's recognition of his government.

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