Economia Comportamental do Crime: Processos duais, ambiguidade e escolha intertemporal
Palavras-chave:
Teoria Econômica do Crime, Economia Comportamental, Escolha Intertemporal, AmbiguidadeResumo
Este estudo tem como objetivo revisar e sistematizar a bibliografia de Economia Comportamental do Crime. A análise foi estruturada em três grandes áreas: processos cognitivos duais, ambiguidade e inconsistência intertemporal, por se tratarem de temas fortemente vinculados à Economia Comportamental. Em cada um desses tópicos, são explorados seus efeitos sobre a tomada de decisão criminal, bem como as implicações resultantes para políticas públicas de aplicação da lei (law enforcement) e para a formulação de normas no âmbito do Direito Criminal.
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