Regulação antitruste adaptativa para mercados algorítmicos: integrando economia comportamental e escolha racional na governança digital
Palavras-chave:
regulação antitruste, economia comportamental, escolha racional, regulação algorítmica, inteligência artificialResumo
A digitalização acelerada dos mercados e a automação da tomada de decisões econômicas por meio de algoritmos têm superado os marcos tradicionais do direito da concorrência, dando origem a novas formas de poder econômico e de coordenação tácita que desafiam a capacidade regulatória dos Estados. Nesse sentido, este artigo propõe um arcabouço jurídico para a regulação antitruste em ambientes algorítmicos, combinando a teoria da escolha racional com a economia comportamental, a fim de equilibrar a coerência normativa, a efetividade dissuasória e a adaptabilidade tecnológica.
Os resultados revelam que a economia comportamental, embora ofereça ferramentas valiosas para compreender vieses cognitivos e dinâmicas organizacionais, carece de uma teoria normativa eficaz que assegure a proporcionalidade e a coerência sancionatória. Com base nesse diagnóstico, o estudo propõe um arcabouço jurídico que preserva a racionalidade estrutural do direito, integra mecanismos comportamentais e estabelece padrões de transparência e auditabilidade algorítmica. Assim, avança-se na redefinição da aplicação do direito antitruste, buscando conciliar legitimidade democrática, efetividade empírica e adaptabilidade tecnológica.
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