La filosofía no puede fundamentar la ciencia: el uso injustificado de "consciencia" en el campo científico


  • Alejandro Villamor Iglesias Profesor de Filosofía de Educación Secundaria (Comunidad de Madrid, España)

Palabras clave:

consciencia fenoménica, error categorial, significado como uso, Wittgenstein, eliminativismo


Para muchos, la puesta en cuestión de la consciencia fenoménica es absurdo
puesto que la distinción entre apariencia y realidad no se aplica a ella. Muchos científicos cognitivos y neurocientíficos aceptan la existencia de la consciencia en virtud de tal razonamiento. El presente trabajo cuestiona la justificación de este hecho. La consciencia es un concepto cuyo significado científico proviene de la filosofía o del lenguaje coloquial. A partir de ello, concluye que la “naturaleza autoevidente de la
consciencia” no es una afirmación científica válida. Esta asunción filosófica descansa en un error categorial en el uso científico del lenguaje.


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