Love and Reasons [Spanish]

Authors

  • Juan Pablo Hernández Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

Keywords:

Dispositions, emotions, love, irrationality, arrationality

Abstract

Love and rationality are often considered as capacities which easily come into conflict, or are even opposed to one another. In the paper I elaborate on some points suggested by Harry Frankfurt in order to propose that the relation between love and rationality is not one of opposition. After offering a characterization of love as a hybrid multi-track disposition, I will argue that love is rational in the following sense: although love is not justifiable, it is nevertheless a source of basic and sometimes irresistible reasons which to a large extent shape the field of our rationality. This does not mean that love is an irrational or arrational foundation, or that it is impervious to reason; it only means that in certain circumstances it makes sense to subject love to rational scrutiny.

Author Biography

  • Juan Pablo Hernández, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

    Doctor en Filosofía de la Universidad de Warwick. Profesor asociado de la Facultad de Filosofía de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana y hace parte del grupo de investigación Problemas de Filosofía en la misma institución. En términos generales, su investigación se ocupa de problemas de filosofía de la acción y filosofía moral desde el punto de vista de la filosofía de las emociones. Ha desarrollado y publicado sobre acción y conceptualidad, ética ambiental y naturaleza de las emociones entre otros temas.

References

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Published

2020-02-03

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No. 33 (2020): July-december

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Articles

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