Kantian Republicanism and Legal Normativity [Spanish]

Authors

  • Eduardo Charpenel Universidad Panamericana, campus México

Keywords:

Kant, Philosophy of Right, Theory of Legal Normativity, History of Republicanism, Contemporary Republicanism

Abstract

In this paper, I defend the stance that republicanism -in comparison to othercentral notions- has not been interpreted as one of the main traits that characterize Kant's legal and political philosophy. A plausible reason for this is that Kantianrepublicanism has not occupied a prominent place in the republican narratives,historiographical or systematic, that are dominant in contemporary discussions. Tomy mind, the reason for this is that some innovative characteristics in the Kantianrepublican enterprise are at odds with other republican philosophical projects. Here Idiscuss some distinctive traits of Kant's project regarding his conceptions of the ruleof law, citizenship, political authority, free speech, and international law with theaim of showing that they are an integral part of a political and legal theory that is stillattractive and compelling.

Author Biography

Eduardo Charpenel, Universidad Panamericana, campus México

Associate Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Universidad Panamericana (campus México)

References

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Published

2019-08-05

Issue

No. 32 (2020): January-june

Section

Articles

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