What We Care about: Self-Direction, Identity and Morality [Spanish]

Authors

  • Maria Alejandra Carrasco Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Keywords:

Harry Frankfurt, what we care about, identity, morality, practical reason.

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the controversy between Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf as to whether or not it is important that what we care about is objectively valuable, and whether a completely immoral life is as valuable as a moral life. I argue that although Frankfurt is right in saying that the mere act of caring is already valuable, that is not enough for a meaningful praxis. Given that our ends in life determine our choices, whatever we love will determine the kind of life we have, and different kinds of life are not equally valuable.


Author Biography

Maria Alejandra Carrasco, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Doctora en Filosofía por la Universidad de Navarra (España) y profesora asociada del Instituto de Filosofía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Se ha especializado en temas de ética contemporánea, así como de la Ilustración escocesa, especialmente la teoría de los sentimientos morales de Adam Smith.

References

<div>Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent Virtue. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. Frankfurt, H. (1998a). The Importance of What We Care about. En The Importance of What We Care about (pp. 80-94). Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Frankfurt, H. (1998b). Freedom of The Will and The Concept of Person. En The Importance of What We Care about (pp. 11-25). Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Frankfurt, H. (1998c). Duty and Love. Philosophical Explorations, 1, 4-9. doi: 10.1080/10001998018538686.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Frankfurt, H. (1999). On Caring. En Necessity, Volition and Love (pp. 155-180). Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Frankfurt, H. (2002). Reply to Susan Wolf. En S. Buss &amp; L. Overtone (Eds.), Contours of Agency (pp. 245-252). Massachusetts: MIT Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Frankfurt, H. (2006). Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right. D. Satz (Ed.). California: Standford University Press, California.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Rhonheimer, M. (2007). La perspectiva de la moral. Fundamentos de la ética filosófica. [Traducido al español de Die Perspektive der Moral. Grundlagen der philosophischen Ethik] (2a ed.). Madrid: Rialp.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div><div>Smith, A. (1982). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael y A. L Macfie (Eds.). Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Taylor, Ch. (1985). What is Human Agency? En Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1 (pp. 15-44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Vigo, A. (2010). Identidad práctica e individualidad según Aristóteles. Hypnos, 25, 129-164. Recuperado de: http://www.hypnos.org.br/revista/index.php/hypnos/article/view/234.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Wolf, S. (1997). Meaning and Morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 97(3), 299-315. doi: 10.1111/1467-9264.00018.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Wolf, S. (2002). The True, The Good and The Lovable. Frankfurt’s Avoidance of Objectivity. En S. Buss &amp; L. Overtone (eds.). Contours of Agency (pp. 227-244). Massachusetts: MIT Press.</div></div>
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Published

2020-01-21

Issue

No. 33 (2020): July-december

Section

Articles

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