The Concept of Science in Ockham’s Work [Spanish]

Authors

  • Jean Paul Martínez Zepeda Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso

Keywords:

scientia, suposición, conocimiento intuitivo, hábitos, proposiciones, Ockham.

Abstract

The concept of scientia established in William of Ockham’s work considers firstly, the theory of supposition, which transforms the view of the evident knowledge based on the analysis of terms and propositions as signs of things. Secondly, the intuitive knowledge of singulars, which allows the formulation of necessary propositions that describe facts and state of affairs. Thirdly, a logical approach of science as set of propositions that configure the different sciences.

References

<div><div>Aquino, T. (2009) Suma de Teología. En D. Byrne (trad.). Madrid: BAC.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>De Andrés, T. (1969). El nominalismo de Guillermo de Ockham como filosofía del lenguaje. Madrid: Gredos.</div><div><br /></div><div>Fernández, C. (1980). Filósofos medievales. Madrid: BAC.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Fortuny, F. (1990). Ontología del espíritu: principio de la epistemología de Ockham. Convivum, 1, 55-74. Recuperado de: https://www.raco.cat/index.php/Convivium/article/view/73351</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Gilson, E. (2007). Juan Duns Scoto. Pamplona: EUNSA.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Goddu, A. (1999). Ockham’s Philosophy of Nature. En P. V. Spade, (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (pp. 143-167). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Goddu, A. (2001). The Impact of Ockham’s Reading of the Physics on the Mertonians and Parisian Terminists. Early Science and Medicine, 6(3), 204-236. Doi: 10.1163/157338201X00136</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Karger, E. (1999). Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition. En P. V. Spade (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (pp. 204-226). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>King, P. (2017). The Science of Psychology in Ockham’s Oxford. In Pelletier y Roques (Eds.), The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy (pp. 315-329). Suiza: Springer.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Martínez, J. P. (2018). Ockham y Wittgenstein. Acerca de los alcances y límites de la relación pensamiento-lenguaje. Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, 12, 69-93. Doi: 10.22370/rhv.2018.12.1264.</div><div><br /></div><div>Martínez, J.P. (2020). Intelección, concepto y semántica en la obra de Guillermo de Ockham. Revista Veritas, 46, pp. 157-180. Doi: 10.4067/S0718-92732020000200157</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (1967). Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio) Prologus et Distinctio Prima, Opera Theologica, vol. I. New York: The Franciscan Institute.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (1970). Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio) Distinctiones II-III. Opera Theologica, vol. II. New York: The Franciscan Institute.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (1974). Summa Logicae, Opera Philosophica, vol. I. New York: The Franciscan Institute.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (1978). Expositionis in Libros Artis Logicae Prooemium et Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus, Opera Philosophica, vol. II. New York: The Franciscan Institute.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (1985). Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis (Prologus et I-III) Opera Philosophica, vol. IV. New York: The Franciscan Institute.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (1986). Los sucesivos (y Prólogo a la Exposición de los ocho libros de la Física de Aristóteles). Francisco Fortuny (trad.). Barcelona: Orbis.</div><div><br /></div><div>Ockham, G. (2000). Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio) Distinctiones XIX-XLVIII, Opera Theologica, vol. IV. New York: The Franciscan Institute.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Panaccio, C. (2004). Ockham on Concepts. Quebec: Ashgate.</div><div><br /></div><div>Panaccio, C. (2005). Le nominalime d’Ockham et le représentation mentale. Précis de Ockham on Concepts. Philosophiques, 32(2), 423-426. Doi: 10.7202/011876ar</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Strump, E. (1999). The Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species. En P. V. Spade (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (pp. 168-203). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>Spade, P. V. (2007). Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory. Bloomington: Indiana University. Recuperado de: https://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf</div></div><div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div></div>

Downloads

Published

2020-12-12

Issue

No. 35 (2021): January-june

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2022 Eidos

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Authors who publish with this journal agree to the following terms:

1. The Author retains copyright in the Work, where the term "Work" shall include all digital objects that may result in subsequent electronic publication or distribution.
2. Upon acceptance of the Work, the author shall grant to the Publisher the right of first publication of the Work.
The Author shall grant to the Publisher a nonexclusive perpetual right and license to publish, archive, and make accessible the Work in whole or in part in all forms of media now or hereafter known under a Creative Commons 3.0 License Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported CC BY-NC 3.0, or its equivalent, which, for the avoidance of doubt, allows others to copy, distribute, and transmit the Work under the following conditions: (a) Attribution: Other users must attribute the Work in the manner specified by the author as indicated on the journal Web site;(b) Noncommercial: Other users (including Publisher) may not use this Work for commercial purposes;
4. The Author is able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the nonexclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the Work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), as long as there is provided in the document an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
5. Authors are permitted, and Eidos promotes, to post online the preprint manuscript of the Work in institutional repositories or on their Websites prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (see The Effect of Open Access). Any such posting made before acceptance and publication of the Work is expected be updated upon publication to include a reference to the Eidos's assigned URL to the Article and its final published version in Eidos.