Radical Mechanicism and the Metaphysics of Causation
Keywords:
mechanicism, causation, mechanical theory of causation, new mechanical philosophy, infinite regressAbstract
The mechanical theory of causation is a radicalization of the ‘new mechanical philosophy’ that has been proposed the last twenty years. According to the radical mechanicists, causation can be identified with mechanisms. In this work the radical mechanical perspective is presented and discussed. It is argued, first, that there is a categorial problem affecting the position, because a ‘mechanism’ is a kind of object, while causation is an event or process. Causation, then, cannot be identified with mechanisms, but with the operation of mechanisms. If the radical mechanicist contention is taken according to this last formulation, nevertheless, it appears a dilemma for the mechanicist. Either the interactions of the component parts of a mechanism are forms of causation, or not. If they are, a vicious infinite regress is generated and the theory results explanatorily vacuous. If they are not, causation is turned into an ‘extrinsic’ relation against what has been contended by defenders of the mechanical theory of causality.
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