Reasons and Causes in Freudian Psychoanalysis [Spanish]

Authors

  • Flor Emilce Cely Ávila Universidad El Bosque

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between reasons and causes of action in Freudian psychoanalysis. There is an agreement on the issue that, throughout his work, Freud confused or at least did not make a rigorous distinction between reasons and causes. Two interpretations will be analyzed on this matter. On one hand, a position that holds that there was a naturalistic tendency in Freud and, in that sense, that he never abandoned his aspiration to find the causes of human action. On the other hand, a position that argues that a psychologizing orientation always prevailed in Freud, based on which he defended the search for the meaning of Freudian slips, dreams, etc; which led him to abandon his scientific orientation and to focus on understanding or interpreting the action. As an alternative it is suggested that the conflict in Freud is solved if we discard the dualisms reasons/causes and understanding/explanation.

Author Biography

Flor Emilce Cely Ávila, Universidad El Bosque

Psicóloga, Mg en Filosofía y PhD. en Filosofía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Directora Programa de Filosofía, U. El Bosque

Profesora Departamento de Filosofía Universidad Nacional de Colombia

Published

2015-06-05

Issue

Section

Articles