The Syntactic Approach as a Framework for Ontic Structural Realism [Spanish]

Authors

  • Bruno Borge Universidad de Buenos Aires

Abstract

 

Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) states that a realistic reading of scientific theories (especially of modern physics) requires to take structures as ontologically fundamental. Regardless of how this commitment is articulated, OSR proponents agree that the appropriate framework for developing such a position is the semantic approach to theories. I argue that, at least in aspects relevant to the formulation of OSR, the semantic approach is not superior to the syntactic one. I also show that the Received View has the necessary conceptual resources to adequately express the metaphysical commitments of OSR.

 

Author Biography

Bruno Borge, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Es investigador asistente de la Carreradel Investigador Científico y Tecnológico en el Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Se desempeña además como profesor adjunto de Lógica y Metodología de la Ciencia en la Universidad Nacional de Lomas de Zamora, y docente de Filosofía de las Ciencias en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la UBA. Sus áreas de trabajo son la metafísica científica y la filosofía general de la ciencia.

References

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Published

2018-04-23

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No. 29 (2018): July-December

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Articles

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