The Impossibility of Private Language. Contributions from Formal Pragmatics [Spanish]

Authors

  • Leandro Paolicchi Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Conicet) - Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata

Keywords:

Philosophy, language, pragmatics

Abstract

 

This article addresses the argument developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philoso­phische Untersuchungen about the impossibility of a private language. The objective of this approach is to present a series of arguments, reconstructed from the point of view of transcendental pragmatics of language, which also demonstrate in a finished way the impossibility of such a language. The importance of the transcendental pragmatics reasonings is that they explicitly state a way of considering the very process of argu­mentation that is absent in Wittgenstein’s statements. After presenting the importance and particularities of Wittgenstein’s argument (I and II), the interpretation that can be employed from pragmatics is developed (III), as well as a distinction that must be made when dealing with issues related to language (IV). Finally, some conclusions are drawn.

 

Author Biography

Leandro Paolicchi, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Conicet) - Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata

Doctor en Filosofía. Se desempeña como docente dentro de la Facultad de Humanidades de la Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata (Argentina). En la actualidad es Investigador Asistente del CONICET. Como becario del DAAD, ha realizado estudios de posgrado en la Goethe Universität de Frankfurt am Main en los años 2012 y 2014 bajo la dirección de Axel Honneth. Es autor de los libros “Discurso y Facticidad” y “Praxis, sentido y normatividad. Hacia una reconstrucción pragmática de las acciones humanas”. Sus principales líneas de investigación son las teorías del discurso, la filosofía política y la filosofía contemporánea, especialmente referidas a la Escuela de Frankfurt.

References

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Published

2018-12-03

Issue

No. 30 (2019): January-june

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Articles

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