The Problem of the Reference: The Tension between "Quinean Internalism" and the Thesis of Minimal Externalism [Spanish]
Keywords:
dualism, sheme, content enlightened empirism, semantic externalism, referential indeterminacy, semantic internalism, metasemanticsAbstract
In this paper I analyze the challenge that the Quinean referential indeterminacy thesis poses to a specific set of externalist theories of reference. First, a metasemantic distinction between productive and interpretivist theories is presented, indicating that indeterminacy permeates both. Subsequently, externalist attempts to refute this
problem by stressing the substantive role of external objects in the fixation of reference are evaluated, pointing out that the problem persists. Finally, the "internalist" conception of Quinean reference is analyzed, which, in principle, undermines the externalist
arguments about reference.
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