Experiments, Surveys, and Philosophy
Keywords:
Thought experiments, demoscopic philosophy, intuitions, expertise, justification, meta-philosophy, experimental philosophyAbstract
Some of us are interested in a certain field or approach to philosophical activity usually called “experimental philosophy”. The primary goal of this article is to analyze the main features that characterize this specialty, according to the sense in which the label began to be used. Among other considerations, we will see that the description
“experimental philosophy” is partially correct, but also partially wrong, due to two reasons. The first can be tracked in contemporary discussions that locate antecedents of that approach in connections between philosophy and the empirical sciences through the centuries. To identify the second, more important reason, it will be convenient to evaluate the functions of experimentation, both in the empirical sciences and in philosophy. To reflect on certain types of experiments, mental experiments, will be crucially relevant.
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