A Critical Review on the Thesis of the Depe ndence of the Expe riences of Derek Parfit [Spanish]
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Abstract
In the present investigation the concept of person of Parfit will be analyzed critically. Initially, we will review the general aspects of what Parfit understands by a person, where the essential thing will be to show that although Parfit considers the possibility of conceiving experiences without referring a persons. Subsequently, it will be shown two mental experiments made by Parfit, specifically the My Division argument and the Hospital Argument, which will help to deepen the concept of person of this author and in turn will give account of the thesis that affirms that although the experiences depend for their existence of persons, occur that the identity of experiences would depend on some other entity. From this thesis will be considered certain metaphysical observations of order of E. J. Lowe that will allow to develop certain problems of the concept of person of Parfit.
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