Constructivism and Cognitive Theory of Propositions: An Algorithmic Dimension

Authors

Keywords:

intuitionism, constructivism, propositions, cognitive theory, algorithmic, procedure

Abstract

Intuitionism maintains that numerical series correspond to our intuitions of continuous temporal evolution, with the operations and properties of these sets explained as constructions. Subsequently, the constructivism of the Erlangen School would also consider that logical inferences conceived procedurally involve propositions that account for language as a historical-cultural elaboration. In such a case, the propositional domain would possess a subjective character that goes beyond the conception of these constructions as mere procedural descriptions, thereby demanding a more consistent substrate as its foundation. This need can be met by appealing to Scott Soames’s cognitive theory of propositions as a plausible candidate, since he conceives of propositions as concrete predicative acts. In turn, Soames’s theory does not provide an exhaustive description of the cognitive acts of predication that explain the representational content of propositions. Accordingly, this work focuses on developing a complementary relationship between the two theories that is amenable to algorithmic coding, whereby the computational dimension operates as an articulatory hinge between the two conceptions, ultimately allowing us to formulate a constructivist definition of propositions from a cognitive point of view.

Author Biography

  • Sergio Parra Paine, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

    Sergio Rodrigo Parra Paine
    Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
    srparra@uc.cl
    https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9222-9897

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2026-07-29

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