The De-personalization of Consciousness as the Assumption of Freedom: An Approximation from Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existential Phenomenology [Spanish]
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Abstract
This article will examine the ways in which de-personalization of consciousness constitutes an unavoidable reading clue in order to understand the existential phenomenological conception of human freedom championed by Jean-Paul Sartre. Thus, the study of The Transcendence of the Ego, and of Being and Nothingness, among a few other of Sartre’s writings from the thirties, will allow the reader to discover that the consciousness as an impersonal transcendental field is built as an onto-phenomenological foundation for the full assertion of human freedom. Man is only free, by definition, when he is capable of exiling the ego from consciousness.
Article Details
Section
1. The Author retains copyright in the Work, where the term "Work" shall include all digital objects that may result in subsequent electronic publication or distribution.
2. Upon acceptance of the Work, the author shall grant to the Publisher the right of first publication of the Work.
The Author shall grant to the Publisher a nonexclusive perpetual right and license to publish, archive, and make accessible the Work in whole or in part in all forms of media now or hereafter known under a Creative Commons 3.0 License Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported CC BY-NC 3.0, or its equivalent, which, for the avoidance of doubt, allows others to copy, distribute, and transmit the Work under the following conditions: (a) Attribution: Other users must attribute the Work in the manner specified by the author as indicated on the journal Web site;(b) Noncommercial: Other users (including Publisher) may not use this Work for commercial purposes;
4. The Author is able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the nonexclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the Work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), as long as there is provided in the document an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.
5. Authors are permitted, and Eidos promotes, to post online the preprint manuscript of the Work in institutional repositories or on their Websites prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (see The Effect of Open Access). Any such posting made before acceptance and publication of the Work is expected be updated upon publication to include a reference to the Eidos's assigned URL to the Article and its final published version in Eidos.
References
Arrieta, E. (2016). Derechos humanos, libertad y facticidad: una lectura alternativa desde el pensamiento sartriano. Revista Eletro?nica do Curso de Direito da UFSM, 416-445. Doi:10.5902/1981369422409
Badiou, A. (2006). Logiques des mondes. L'Etre et l'evénement, 2. Paris: Seuil.
Bittoun-Debruyne, N. (1998). Sur L'Imaginaire : Sartre et Husserl. Cahiers de l'Association internationale des étudesfrancaises, 297-310. Recuperado de:
https://www.persee.fr/doc/caief_0571-5865_1998_num_50_1_1325
Deleuze, G. (2002). «Il a été mon maître». En G. Deleuze, 'île déserte et autres textes. Textes et entretiens 1953-. 1974. Paris: Minuit Paradoxe.
École Normale Supérieure. (2013). Le monde dans un miroir. Obtenido de Service Commun de la Documentation: http://www.bib.ens.fr/Le-monde-dans-un-mir.696.0.html
Feron, O. (2009). Contingencia y antropología en la filosofía francesa y alemana. ?????? Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 33-42. Disponible en: http://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/96981/93141
Foucault, M. (1966). Les mots et les choses. Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault, M. (2001). Foucault répond à Sartre. En M. Foucault, Dits et écrits I. 1954-1975 (pp. 690-696). Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault, M., & Dumayet, P. (15 de Juin de 1966). Michel Foucault à propos du livre "Les mots et les choses". Recuperado el 17 de Mayo de 2017, de Institut national de l'audiovisuel: http://www.ina.fr/video/I05059752
González, E. (2007). De la trascendencia del ego al ego trascendental. ???µ?? Revista de Filosofía, 107-118. Recuperado de: http://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/21241
González, M. (2006). Brentano y Natorp ("Intentionalität" y "Bewusstheit"). Revista Philosophica, 30, 103-126. Recuperado de: https://biblat.unam.mx/es/revista/revista-philosophica/3
Gros, A. (2017). El yo no es amo en su propia casa: una revisita sistemática de la teoría de la subjetividad de Sigmund Freud. Eidos, (26), 74-104. Doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14482/eidos.26.8646
Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica 1. (J. Gaos, Trad.) México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Husserl, E. (1984). Husserliana-Gesammelte Werke. Band XIX/I. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Text der I. und der 2. Auflage ergänzt durch. U. Panzer (Ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (1996). Meditaciones cartesianas. M. García Morente y M. García-Baró (Trads.). México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Husserl, E. (1999a). Investigaciones lógicas 1. (M. García, & J. Gaos, Trads.) Madrid: Alianza.
Husserl, E. (1999b). Investigaciones lógicas 2. M. García Morente y M. García-Baró (Trads.). Madrid: Alianza.
Husserl, E. (2005). Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica, 2. (A. Zirión, Trad.) México: Fondo de Cultura Económica y Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Husserl, E. (s.f). Quinta investigación lógica. Texto inédito de la primera edición, traducido y comentado por el doctor Miguel García-Baró (Primera ed.). M. García-Baró (Trad.). Madrid: Inédito (documento de trabajo).
Kant, l. (2007). Crítica de la razón pura. (M. Caimi, Trad.) Buenos Aires: Losada.
Khalfa, J. (2000). Deleuze et Sartre: Idée d'une conscience impersonnelle. Temps modernes, (608), 189-222.
Levy, L. (2016). Intentionality, Consciousness, and the Ego: The Influence of Husserl's Logical Investigations on Sartre's Early Work. The European Legacy, 511-524.
Luft, S. (2011). Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. London/New york: Routledge.
Mounier, E. (1949). Le personnalisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France
Muñoz, W. (2015). Integración de la libertad: perspectiva ontológica de la libertad a partir de El ser y la nada de Sartre. Eidos, (22), 253-281.
Doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14482/eidos.22.5703
Natorp, P. (1888). Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Freiburg: Akademischer Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Natorp, P. (1912). Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck).
Perrin, C. (2010). Sartre ou la fausse question de l'humanisme. Archives de Philosophie, 297-310.
Priest, S. (2002). The subject in question: Sartre's critique of Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego. New york/London: Routledge.
Ruiz, J. (2007). Un problema de la fenomenología: la controversia entre Husserl y Natorp. Investigaciones fenomenológicas, 209-223. Recuperado de:
http://e-spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv/bibliuned:InvFen-2007-5-5060/Documento.pdf
Sartre, J.-P. (1940). L'imaginaire : psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination . Paris: Gallimard.
Sartre, J.-P. (1943). L'être et le néant. Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique. Paris: Gallimard.
Sartre, J.-P. (1947). Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: l'intentionnalité. En J.-P. Sartre, Situations I: Essais critiques (pp. 29-32). Paris: Gallimard.
Sartre, J.-P. (1949). Situations, III. Lendemains de guerre. Paris: Gallimard.
Sartre, J.-P. (1966a). La Transcendance de l'ego. Esquisse d'une description phénoménologique, introduction, notes et appendices par Sylvie Le Bon. Paris: Vrin.
Sartre, J.-P. (1966b). J.-P. Sartre répond. L?Arc, 30, 93. Recuperado de: http://www.pileface.com/sollers/IMG/pdf/Sartre_repond_in_Arc.pdf
Sartre, J.-P. (1983). Les carnets de la drôle de guerre. Novembre 1939 - Mars 1940. Paris: Gallimard.
Tepley, J. (2015). Sartre's non-egological theory of consciousness. En S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C.
Bravo (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (pp. 298-316). Abingdon/New york: Routledge.
Vera, R. (2010). Crítica a la ontología y gnoseología del yo en Paul Natorp desde la perspectiva de la fenomenología realista (tesis doctoral). Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid.