The Rational Expression of the Soul in the Aristotelian Psychology: Deliberating Reasoning and Action [Spanish]

Authors

  • Katherine Esponda Contreras Universidad Santiago de Cali

Abstract

This article aims to explore the properly human dimensions of rationality and the faculties of discernment from the point of view of Aristotelian psychology. In this context, I want to specify what are the characteristics of the so-called deliberative reasoning, what are its constituent elements, and how this formal structure explains the voluntary action that has been chosen. This is based on a comparison between the elements of the chosen action (desire, deliberation and preferential choice) and the parts of the deliberative reasoning (major and minor premises and conclusion). I want to defend the thesis according to which the deliberative reasoning is the type of reasoning carried out by an agent to act deliberately. It works as an explanation tool for the action that is voluntary and chosen. It is not the same practical syllogism, although it shares with it essential characteristics such as its double composition between desiderative and cognitive elements. To do this, we propose the following: first, we explore those characteristics of the soul that define what is properly human as proposed by Aristotle, pointing specifically to how human beings express their rationality. Second, the constitutive elements of the action praxis (desire-deliberation-election) are established comparatively with the constitutive elements of deliberative reasoning (major and minor premises and conclusion). Finally, the incontinent action is defined as an error in the deliberative process described previously. Based on the above, it is concluded that, although incontinent action is defined as an error in the deliberative process, it must be explained from the paradigm of deliberative reasoning to open further discussions, such as, for example, the moral responsibility that this type of action has.


Author Biography

Katherine Esponda Contreras, Universidad Santiago de Cali

Magíster en Filosofía, Universidad del Valle (2014). Especialista en Cultura de Paz y DIH, PUJ (2017). Actualmente es docente de la Universidad Santiago de Cali, Facultad de Comunicación y Publicidad, Departamento de Humanidades, orientando en los últimos dos años cátedras de Epistemología, Ética, Bioética y Campo Investigativo. Dentro de su campo de interés docente e investigativo, además de la ética, la ciudadanía y la cultura de paz, se encuentra la filosofía antigua y la ética antigua.

References

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Published

2018-04-23

Issue

Section

Articles