Second-Order Necessitism [Spanish]

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José Tomás Alvarado Marambio

Abstract

In a series of writings Timothy Williamson has argued for necessitism (cf. Wi­lliamson, 1978/9, 1990, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2010, 2013, forthcoming “Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic”), i. e. the thesis that it is necessary that everything exists necessarily. This work discusses second-order necessitism, i. e. the thesis that it is necessary that every property exists necessarily, considering lines of argument similar to those displayed on first-order. Three of those arguments are exa­mined. (i) the necessary character of being a property, (ii) the occurrence of properties in propositions, and (iii) the ontological commitments of the metalanguage where the semantics is formulated. It is argued that none of them are compelling. The justification for second-order necessitism seems to require more substantive metaphysics than formal results, at least if the formal results in view are those discussed here.

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Author Biography

José Tomás Alvarado Marambio, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Instituto de Filosofía

Profesor Asociado en el Instituto de Filosofía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile