Conditionals: Inference and Relevance [Spanish]
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Abstract
In this paper we discuss three semantic formulations of conditional: material, strict and relevant. Our aim is to show that the relevant conditional shapes our intuitions better than the other two. Since the semantic interpretation of the relevant conditional is an unsettled issue nowadays, we propose a pragmatic interpretation of it. In the first part of the paper we present the criteria to which a theory of conditionals must answer, i.e. the theory must not overgenerate. In the second one, we show that the material and the strict conditionals overgenerate because both lead to paradoxes. In the last part we show that the relevant conditional with a pragmatic interpretation solves the problem of the other conditionals.
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