Implicaciones de la securitización en América desde la particularidad
Keywords:
Regional integration, securitization, international policyAbstract
This article shows the implications arising from a constructivist analysis of the relation between the subjects of the foreign policy agenda of a country like Colombia and the result of its integration to the region. This explains that as a conditioning like securitization in a nation policy exists, it will be difficult to arrange common policies with other countries. To the Colombian State, the illicit drugs case, for instance, has brought about problems of coordination between its antidrugs policy and its capacity to handle it in a specific scenario like the Andean one. At the same time, the present defense and democratic security policies show a break between what it is understood as democratic security and the perception society has of it. Both cases will help to understand how when securitizing a political situation, the State can lose its direction both at international and domestic level.
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